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A

s of this writing, the New Hampshire primary
is scheduled to take place in just about two
months—on Tuesday, February 9, just eight days
after the first nomination contest, the Iowa caucuses.
Numerous polls have already told us what the voters
are contemplating “if the election were held today.” In
interpreting what the polls mean for the actual primary
election, however, we need to take into consideration
several caveats.

1. Voters are mostly undecided (even close
to election day).
The polls typically pressure respondents to say
how they would vote if the election were held
immediately, and so most poll respondents will
give some name. But that doesn’t mean they are
committed to that candidate. Typically, leading up
to the election, anywhere between half to threequarters of the voters are still trying to decide whom
to choose. That means that last-minute swings in
support are quite possible and quite common.
For example, in the 2012 primary, 29 percent of
GOP voters indicated right before the election that they
were still unsure as to which candidate they would vote
for. Two months before the 2012 primary, 59 percent
were unsure. Two months before the 2016 primary, 55
percent of Republicans and 45 percent of Democrats
say they still have not decided who they will vote for.

2. Even “decided” voters can change their
minds at the last minute—because there are
no party differences among candidates.
In a general election contest, voters’ preferences are
highly influenced by their party affiliation. Even voters who know little about a candidate can still rely
on the candidate’s party as an indicator of whom to
choose. But in a primary contest, there is no party
difference to anchor voter preferences. Often the
policy differences among candidates are so slight,
the voter could just as easily vote for one candidate
as another. Thus, last minute ads, news stories, and
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campaign activities that suddenly favor one candidate over another could cause a major swing in voter
preferences in just a short time.

3. Pollsters’ predictions of voter turnout are
fraught with problems that can distort results.
Unlike many states, New Hampshire allows any
resident of voting age to participate in the primary,
even if they are not previously registered. Anywhere
from 10 to 15 percent of a New Hampshire primary
electorate consists of people who register to vote at
the polls on Election Day. Many pollsters use past primary voting lists as their source for sampling respondents, but that approach would exclude the “walk-in”
voters, who could be quite different from the rest of
the voters—thus resulting in misleading poll results.

4. Final pre-election polls in the New
Hampshire primary have often been right,
but almost as often, they have been wrong.
Because of the factors mentioned above, polling in
the New Hampshire primary has been inconsistent
in its accuracy. In 2008, the polls did an excellent job
in predicting the Republican winner (John McCain),
but they were all wrong in predicting the Democratic
winner (Hillary Clinton, not Barack Obama as the
polls showed). Other years in which the polling in
New Hampshire differed significantly from the final
results include 1968, 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988,
1992, 1996, and 2000.
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The major problem is that the polls typically stop two
to three days before the election, and therefore don’t catch
changes that occur right before people vote. Exit polls
(taken as voters leave the voting booths) have consistently
shown that up to one-third or more of New Hampshire
voters say they made up their minds only in the last three
days before the election, including one in six who say they
made up their minds on Election Day itself.
Given these caveats, it’s prudent to take a skeptical
look at what the polls are showing us. They measure
voters’ top-of-mind reactions to the candidates, but
with no guarantee that the voters will retain those
views as the election approaches.

The Iowa Effect
One thing to keep in mind is that the Iowa caucuses
just eight days before the New Hampshire primary
can upend candidate standings in New Hampshire,
rendering irrelevant any polls taken prior to the
Iowa contest. Unfortunately for pundits, the Iowa
Effect is not always predictable.
For Republicans, recent history suggests the Iowa
results have little effect on a candidate’s standing in
New Hampshire. Such was the case for George W. Bush
in 2000, who won Iowa but lost big to John McCain in
New Hampshire. Similarly, Mike Huckabee (2008) and
Rick Santorum (2012) did not see any boost in their
New Hampshire standings after winning in Iowa.
However, not-so-recent history provides a different
lesson. In 1980, for example, George H. W. Bush was
initially helped in New Hampshire by winning in Iowa,
as was Bob Dole in 1988. And in 1996, Pat Buchanan
was helped by his second place showing in Iowa.
While history gives us a mixed message about the
effect of Iowa on New Hampshire for Republicans, a
good showing in Iowa for Democrats typically helps
the candidate in New Hampshire. That was the case
with Obama in 2008, John Kerry in 2004, Richard
Gephardt and Paul Simon in 1988, Gary Hart in 1984,
and Jimmy Carter in 1980 and 1976. The good showings in Iowa did not always translate into victories in
New Hampshire (for example, Obama, and Gephardt
and Simon), but they did give the candidates a boost.
For 2016, the Iowa Effect seems uncertain for the
GOP, but perhaps a bit more predictable for Democrats.
One explanation why Iowa seems to have no effect
on New Hampshire for the Republican candidates in
recent times is that the electorates in the two states are
quite different. Exit polls in 2008 and 2012, for example,

show that 12 percent and 17 percent of Iowa caucus
voters respectively considered themselves “moderate”
or “liberal,” compared with 45 percent and 47 percent
respectively of New Hampshire primary voters. Also, the
percentage of evangelicals in Iowa is almost three times
greater than in New Hampshire: In 2008, 23 percent in
New Hampshire, 60 percent in Iowa; in 2012, 22 percent
in New Hampshire, 57 percent in Iowa.
By contrast, the ideological profile of Democratic
voters in Iowa and New Hampshire are quite similar: In
2008, the last competitive cycle, exit polls showed Iowa
with liberals outnumbering moderates/conservatives
by 54 percent to 46 percent, while in New Hampshire
the comparable figures were 57 percent to 43 percent.
Given these data, one could speculate that for
Democrats, a victory in Iowa for either Bernie Sanders
or Hillary Clinton could give the winner a boost in
New Hampshire.
For Republicans, such speculation would be iffy.
The GOP contest is complicated by Donald Trump,
whose support appears fairly robust with both the very
conservative/evangelical wing and also the less conservative wing of the party. One effect of Iowa, if not to
help the top two or three candidates get a boost in New
Hampshire (and Iowa may—or may not—do that), is
that the Iowa caucus results may well reduce the slate
of candidates. For both parties, Iowa has typically had a
screening effect, with only the top two or three candidates able to continue effectively into New Hampshire.
Still, even that pattern may be upset this year,
because of the large amounts of money available to
candidates from rich donors—and because of the
unusually large number of candidates. The screening
process could be much slower this year, with wellfunded candidates able to continue their campaigns
even if they lose in several of the early contests.
As for current polls predicting the winners in New
Hampshire, history suggests considerable caution. As
that famous Yogi-ism warns us, “It ain’t over till it’s over.”
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